ABSTRACT. Aim of this paper is to confute two views, the first about Schröder's presumptive foundationalism, according to he founded mathematics on the calculus of relatives; the second one mantaining that Schröder only in his last years (from 1890 onwards) focused on an universal and symbolic language (by him called pasigraphy). We will argue that, on the one hand Schröder considered the problem of founding mathematics already solved by Dedekind, limiting himself in a mere translation of the Chain Theory in the language of the relatives. On the other hand, we will show that Schröder's pasigraphy was connaturate to himself and that it roots in his very childhood and in his love for foreign languages.
INTRODUCTION
The present article develops in two sections: the first one (Section 2), devoted to refute the opinion that Schröder founded mathematics on the calculus of relations, the second one (Section 3), devoted to prove that Schröder already in his youth was interested in the various forms of language. As the the reader can see, there is an overlapping between these parts, as the calculus of relations was choosen by Schröder as a suitable universal language in which express mathematics. In this sense, the calculus of relations must be regarded on the background of other similar efforts, as Peano's lingua franca, aiming to find a purely symbolic language for mathematics. I know that Schröder states explicitely that the main goal of his calculus of relatives is to give a definition of number, but, as argued elsewhere, I believe that it would be more appropriate saying that Schröder tried to translate in terms of relations Dedekind's definition of number. 1 Some scholars may rebuke my interpretations, invoking the faithfulness to Schröder's own words. To them, I reply that sometimes we need to go beyond the literal expressions to grasp the meaning in question, more or less as a psychiatrist does in analyzing the not-said, the unconscious. 2 But it is not only a matter of interpretation. Schröder is ambigous on this point: if in the first lectures of the third volume of the Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik he seems interested in founding mathematics on the calculus of relations, with the passing of the time, he become aware of the power of the theory of relation as a symbolic language. From that point onwards, Schröder puts aside the calculus of relatives in itself to translate set-theoretic problems in his new language. Now Schröder recognizes that his calculus of relations is not only a calculus but it is also a language: a language more expressive that Peano's one, for example. This is my rationale to support the thesis that from the third volume of the Vorlesungen, devoted to the calculus of relations, Schröder turned to set-theoretic problem, as that concerning the well-foundness [Sch01a] . On this point too there is no agreement between the scholars. They insist that Schröder was interested in relations in themselves, but that this work was interrupted by a repentine death. Nevertheless, from the publication of the third volume of the Vorlseungen (1895) and Schröder's death (1902) passed seven year that he could spend in many ways. Neither it can be said that Schröder was diverted by his university duties, because he was rector of Karlsrue university one year only, or that he was unable to copy with his numerous hobbies, as Dipert mantains: Among Schröder's hobbies were hiking, swimming, ice-skating, horseback riding, and gardening 3 -and perhaps these are what Lüroth is also suggesting distracted Schröder from his research. 4 Schröder had the possibility to focus on one matter in place of another. If the German mathematician would continue in investigating the calculus of relations in itself, and not as a language in which tackling set-theoretical questions, he had the free will to do it. As a matter of fact, he was more allured by set-theory. It is not so difficult to understand. As a human being, Schröder had the choice to think what he more liked. Die Gedanken sind frei sings the Mahler prisoner in the tower. Albeit condemned to death, he is free to think what he will.
Summarizing: the major part of scholars engaged in Schröder consider him as a logician; i.e. a mathematician that from 1877 converted his activity to logic. I confute this view. Schröder was and remained all along his life a mathematician. He searched for new fields of work, but not leaving a mathematical style of thought. For this reason, he passed from the calculus of relations to the more appealing (and mathematical) set-theory. 5 Finally, Schröder's pasigraphy and Schröder's theory of relations are two faces of the same object, that we can see from different perspectives. It is right asserting that from a point of view and in a precise lapse of time, Schröder regarded the theory of relations from a computational point of view, but it is also right asserting that in another time he regarded this theory as a symbolic language. This must be conceded. Then, my article is devoted to the same theory viewed in two different ways in two different moments.
With the following section I ponder on Schröder's presumptive foundationalism, casting light on the time when Schröder passed to consider the theory of relations a language in which translating and not founding mathematical concepts.
TO FOUND: THAT IS THE QUESTION
Elsewhere I asserted that Ernst Schröder was to be considered a mathematician and not a logician, being his knowledge in issue very meager, and because he was engaged all life long in mathematical questions (as in the algebraic Solution Problem). 6 Schröder had a structural view of mathematics, according to, any concept has a meaning only in virtue of the place it takes inside the theory. 7 In other words, the mathematical concepts are contextdependent, being this context a relational lattice. 8 Well, if a mathematical theory is only a set of relations, what does Schröder mean with relation?
This question lays at the core of Schröder's work, because mathematical formulas are only strings of symbols without interpretation. For Schröder, a formula means something only inside the theory in which is formulated, and such theory is a structured set of relations. 9 For this ground, reaching a satisfiying definition of relation is of fundamental importance, because on the concept of relational structured theory all Schröder's mathematical work revolves. With this goal in sight, Schröder devoted the third volume of his Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik [Sch66] to an analysis of the concept of relation.
Because of some ambiguity on the side of Schröder, these investigations culminate at the same time in a language by signs [Zeichensprache] or Pasigraphy, able to express the main concepts of the exact sciences, and to free mathematics from the chains of the natural speech. 10 Schröder was not alone in envisaging an universal language in the 19th century. This search was typical of the period. After Latin ceased to be the lingua franca for scientists and humanists, the need of a substitute was urgent in order to facilitate the dialogue between people speaking different languages. This is not a trivial matter of human comunication (and understanding). I think to the language of music. Thanks to its universality is understandable by anyone. The same score can be performed by a German, by a Russian, by an Inuit (Eskimo), and this way the performers can interchange their interpretations.
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Unfortunately, things are a little more involved in natural languages, than in music. We cannot presuppose the knowledge of any language by a mathematician to make mathematics. Such requirement would get rid of those scholar without linguistic abilities. Today, the lingua franca of mathematics (and of many other disciplines as well) is English, but not in Schröder's time. In the second half of the 19th century, many languages could pretend to be the new lingua franca; but preferring one language to another would caused that any nation supported own language with a sort of nationalism.
But a discipline, as mathematics, which is famous for its universality could not accept the rule of one language over another. This was surely the ground backing up the search of a new lingua franca. I am obliged to stress again Schröder's formalism. It would make no sense expressing formulas spoiled of any meaning whatever, by a natural language with all its references to an interpreted world. It is best forging a new language from scratch.
Schröder The lecture of the third volume of the Vorlesungen devoted to this topic is the ninth. I tempted to say that this lecture has a virtuostic appeal. A sort of exercises to be performed, before to face the important mathematical questions of the time, more or less, as a piano player studies sets of exercises in order to perform a difficult score.
One could questions my interpretation, quoting Schröder himslef:
The . Peić's pasigraphy is simply a vocabulary of numbers. To any word of natural language is assigned a number. This way, a discourse is a collection of different numbers. Personally, I consider de Maimieux' and Peić's efforts a little too exotic. Perhaps, Schröder knew these or similar work. I don't believe that he created the name of 'pasigraphy', from the ancient Greek, by himself. There are too many striking coincidences. 13 For the most part, these statments are rules governing the construnction of well-formed formulas in the calculus of relatives. A couple of them express properties of well formed formulas in this calculus.
14 I remember Schröder's ambiguity on the role of the calculus of relatives: calculus and language at the same time. 15 2.1. A little exemplification. I will show a couple of Dedekind's theorems translated in terms of relations. Let a, b, c, be binary relations whatsoever. 1 denote the universe of thought. The sign ; denotes the composition of relations. If we assume for a while that f and x are relations, f ; x is the relational translation of f (x): 
Roughly speaking, a chain is a relation which is closed under an application (a; b ⊆ b). Now, we state the correspondenting sentences by Dedekind. A, B, C, S and Z are systems (what today we call sets), A ′ is the image of A under some function φ, M denotes the union of systems, G denotes the overlapping of systems, and the relation of inclusion:
Theorem. The image of every common part of A, B, C, . . ., and therefore that of the intersection
Definition. If φ is a similar
20 or dissimilar mapping of a system S, and φ(S) is a part of a system Z, then φ is said to be a mapping of S into Z, and we say S is mapped by φ into Z.
37. Definition. K is called a chain [Kette] when K ′ K. 38. Theorem. S is a chain. 39. Theorem. The image K ′ of a chain K is a chain.
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I will not be polemic, but as it is evident from a comparison between Schröder's list and Dedekind's one, we cannot speak of foundation at all. Does D22 found the theorem 22 by Dedekind? I don't believe. On the contrary, a comparison shows that Schröder and Dedekind are speaking of the same matter with different languages. I may only concede to my oppositors that a relation is more general than a function. But no more. The closure of a chain (theorem 37 by Dedekind) is perfectly mimicked by D37 in Schröder. In any case, no one of the above theorems and definitions by Schröder are more fundamental than the corresponding ones by Dedekind.
But this is not all. Who can understimate the role of the principle of induction in Dedekind's work? The following is the principle in issue as laid down by Dedekind: 80. Theorem of complete induction (inference from n to n ′ ). In order to show that a theorem holds for all numbers n of a chain m 0 , it is sufficient to show, ρ. that it holds for n = m, and σ. that from the validity of the theorem for a number n of the chain m 0 its validity 19 Obviously, in the following, D stays for 'Dedekind'. Notice that Schröder had a no clear idea of connec- for the following number n ′ always follows.
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This is the Gegensatz in Schröder:
Analyzing the above sentence will carry us too far. It is sufficient to note that the request that b ⊆ c corresponds to the first premise (ρ) in Dedekind, and that a; (a 0 ; b)c ⊆ c corresponds to the second premise above (σ). Ergo, the conclusion (a 0 ; b ⊆ c) holds too.
To use Schröder's own words:
We can rephrase in natural language the sentence D59 -considered for the time being uniquely as a theorem on binary relations -in the following way: To prove, that the a-chain 24 of a relative b is included in a third relation c, we need only to make two things; i.e. it is sufficient to show: We may rephrase the principle of induction also in the following manner:
26 As it is easily to see, also in this case we have only a translation of a principle stated in terms of sets in an analogue (albeit more general) in the calculus of relatives.
Only one question reamins open. We asserted that the concept of relation generalizes that of function or set, because these are only a particular cases of relations. One could be tempted to say that it is that generality to constitue a fundament; i.e. the theorems in the calculus of relations found their pendants in set theory because they are more general, more uncompassing. It could be, but nowhere Schröder states such position, limiting to shed light on the more perspicuity and elegance of his symbolic calculus. In other words, for Schröder is a matter of rethoric, not of founding. In fact, let give voice again to Schröder:
With this [i.e. the symbolic language of the relatives] the reader has at his disposal a key to translate one representation of the chain theory in the other. As one can see, our method of symbolize [Bezeichnungsweise] is the most expressive. (. . . ) our representation of the chain theory is so no way inferior in clarity to any other -neither to that of a such master of precision and concision, who is its author [i. If until this point of the Vorlesungen Schröder was engaged in investigating the concept of 'relation', because from this concept depends its structural philosophy of mathematics, now there is a shift in this thought: can the calculus of relatives not only solve some theoretical problem, but also serve as a symbolic language? For Schröder the answer is adfirmative, and indeed in the following sections of the Vorlsegunen Schröder focuses on translating some set-theoretical pivotal notions in the calculus of relatives: set, function, etc.
2.2. Brady on Schröder's foundationalism. My interpretation relies on considering Schröder a mathematician and not a logician as usually. As a matter of fact, Schröder knew of logic by authors who were eminent mathematicians, as Boole and de Morgan, both engaged in analysis (derivation and integration) and not from philosophers. 31 Furthermore, many scholars considers as epiphanic the short autobiographical sketch in [Unk01] , which I am not sure was written by Schröder, at least in its entirity. Really, that sketch is a sort of publicity for which Schröder payed. In any case, despite my own interpretation, I repute correct to give voice to some scholars mantaining that Schröder and not the definition of a single number n. 31 With the utmost probability, Schröder knew the work of Robert Grassmann, by the brother of the late, Hermann Grassmann, a mathematician engaged in Vector Calculus. 32 In particular, the ninth lecture. on Brady's book [Bra00] . Obviously this point of view is common (in some case, only partly) to the eminent historian Volker Peckhaus, to Risto Villko and to Javier Legris. For the respective positions of these three scholars, I refer to the bibliography. In this place, for sake of clarity I will take in consideration only the work of Geraldine Brady, leaving aside further declinations.
[The Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik offer] the first exposition of abstract lattice theory, 33 the first exposition of Dedekind's theory of chains after Dedekind, the most comprehensive development of the calculus of relations, and a treatment of the foundations of mathematics in relation calculus that Löwenheim in 1940 still thougth was as reasonable as set theory. 34 And some page below, Schröder translates Dedekind's set-theoretic treatment of chains line-byline into the second-intentional calculus of relatives. With this, Schröder shows that the second-intentional theory of relatives is sufficient to develop number theory. 35 The antecedent of this quotation is right: as a matter of fact, as seen before, Schröder translated Dedekind's theory of chains in his calculus of relatives, but Geraldine Brady draws from this antecedent a false consequent. She does not take in account that Schröder's calculus of relations was both a calculus and a symbolic language. When we speak of translating, the calculus of relatives as language is meant. Schröder limited himself to re-write the Kettenlehre in his calculus of relatives. Is it sufficient such re-writing to speak of foundationalism? If I translate the word death in German as Tod, I am not founding the English concept of death in the German one. It is only a question of translating a string of symbols in another string of symbols. No foundation is required.
But Brady insists, referring to Leopold Löwenheim and Alfred Tarski:
The Peirce-Schröder theme that higher intentional relative calculus can be a full foundation for mathematics recurs twice in later mathematical history. First, Löwenheim [Löw40] made the claim that the relative calculus was just as suitable for a foundation of mathematics as set theory. Second, the theme of Set Theory without Variables [TG87] of Tarski and Givant (1987) is that a form of binary relation calculus is adequate as a foundation for all of mathematics, and uses no variables.
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That both Löwenheim and Tarski had foundational goals is manifest; that Schröder was a source of inspiration for them is also true. What is false, is that Schröder too was a foundationalist. He inspired foundationalists, without being himself a foundationalist. In the same page Brady quotes C.S. Peirce:
The nearest approach to a logical analysis of mathematical reasoning that has ever been made was Schröder We must keep in mind that for Schröder the calculus of relations was not only a calculus, but also a language in which expressing the main concepts of the exact sciences, as Legris rightly states: Algebra of relatives is considered both as a universal language, and as a theory on which any scientific science can be founded.
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I cannot but agree with Legris on the duplice nature of the calculus of relatives, language and calculus (or theory) at the same time; notwithstanding, I don't believe that the calculus of relatives had for Schröder a foundational character, as this paper is aiming to prove. For the German mathematician, the calculus of relatives was only a lattice of formulas devoid of meaning, and so capable of many interpretations (models). And from this fact, Schröder' structuralism arises. It can be sound strange that the calculus of relations is both a language and a calculus, but we must keep in mind that for Schröder a language is devoid of any interpretation. It is not Frege's Conceptual Notation which has a canonical interpretation [Bon13]; i.e. it refers to only one interpretation. From this point of view, Frege's language is nearer to the natural languages than Schröder's one.
No canonical interpretation is presupposed by Schröder, the words of his language being only formal well-formed formulas. His language tells nothing. It needs a model to become informative. It is not by chance that Schröder called his language a language by signs.
Schröder's calculus of relatives is completely formal, being a lattice of well-formed formula which are strings of inkspots (signs) on paper. It is this formality which the calculus of relatives and an universal language share. Calculus and language are two sides of the same coin.
ON PASIGRAPHY
We can now pass to the second task of this paper: summing up some evidence to showing that Schröder's pasigraphy was connaturate to his author and not an hobby which Schröder cultivates in his last years. First of all, I repute interesting to question why Schröder calculus of relatives aimed just to it, to a universal language for mathematics.
For Schröder the pasigraphy 40 was the best possible language for mathematics and in order to show this, he translated Dedekind's Chain Theory in his language. The ninth lecture of the third volume of the Vorlesungen is so not devoted to foundational aims, but to exhibit the power and elegance of the calculus of relations, as mantained above:
I will here not insist, that in our discipline [i.e. in the calculus of relatives], we succeeded in condensing even more the sentences of such a master of concision [i.e. Dedekind](. . . ).
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From this quotation is manifest the care Schröder gave to in shaping his language. Any symbol of it is carved with the utmost attention, as it is the case for the symbols for sum and product of relations:
Because the non commutative behaviour of the sum between relatives, I shaped [gestaltet] the plus-sign not symmetrically; Peirce, instead, managed with the erected Cross as in death notices. For similar reasons, I choose for the relative multiplication the semicolon, because this is a not symmetrical sign, adapt to represent a not symmetrical composition (. . . ) 42 In other words, from the shape of the sign it must be evident his rôle. In fact, the non symmetrical sign of ";" denotes and suggests a not commutative (not symmetrical) operation. We could say that Schröder's pasigraphy is really an Ideography, a pictorial symbolism, a language by pictures. 43 The meaning of a sign is suggested by its picture. Take for example the symbol †. Its picture suggests the death, being the image of the cross on which our Lord Jesu Christ died.
The first time Schröder uses the word "Pasigraphie" is in his 1890 delivered prolusion [Sch90] , six years before his famous contribute at the First International Mathematical Congress held in Zürich: 44 Such system of signs [Bezeichnung] is, once extended to the entire field of the objects of thought, in opposition to the signs of the [natural] words, which are more or less equivalent from the point of view of the content they represent, a typical language of concepts, a conceptual notation [Begriffsschrift] 45 , and in contrast to the various languages used by normal people, a general language of the thing, a Pasigraphy or a Universal Language. 46 Notice what Schröder is stating: while the signs of the words of a natural language are more or less equivalent from the point of view of the content they represent, the signs of 40 We must say "Schröder's pasigraphy", because his pasigraphy was not the unique. Volapük, Esperanto or other similar linguistic efforts were all a pasigraphy, an universal language. 41 the calculus of relatives manifest their content by their picture. It is not so in many natural languages, where the words have a denotation which is independent from their graphical appearance. Take again the symbol †. We said that it reminds the reader to the death, being a pictorial symbol. Take now the word 'death'; nothing in its graphical form suggests that 'death' denotes the death. It is only a matter of convention. Obviously, there is no unique symbol to indicate ideographically the death, but the question is not on the univocity of a denotation, but in the ability to denote by a picture.
Any way, compare the last quotation from the Vorlesungen with the incipit of [dM97] :
The word PASIGRAPHY is composed by two Greek words, to all, and GRAPHO, I am writing. What is interesting in these two last quotations by de Maimieux is the definiton of pasigraphy as language by signs. So we found the reason why Schröder introduced in his vocabulary the word 'pasigraphy': it denotes an universal language by pictures (signs). There is not a phasigraphical phase in Schröder's thought as maintained from some scholars: from 1873 onwards, Schröder spoke of a language by signs. 49 Now, he attached a more popular name to it.
Obviously, I don't believe that Schröder knew the work of de Maimieux or that of Peić. He cited only the Volapük as source of inspiration; but it is not to be excluded that Schröder found in Schleyer's books some reference to previous linguistic efforts named pasigraphy.
Finally, we must not forget Schröder's interest in learning diverse languages:
At the age of eight, due largely to his grandfather's encouragement, he could read Latin. Padoa. These linguistic abilities thus placed him in an important position in logic of the late 19th century, which was increasingly becoming an international discipline, with major works in English, German, and Italian (or Peano's latino sine flexione).
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Unfortunately, this quotation seems exhibiting a Schröder whose only merit was to organize the calculus of relatives and to mantain links between logicians from diverse linguistic areas. It is not so. I quoted this long excerpt by Dipert only because it stress Schröder's love for speaking diverse language. I don't share Dipert's overall interpretation of Schröder.
What it is interesting is that Schröder's pasigraphy has many roots: on one side, it is the result of Schröder genuine love for language, on the other side, it is the consequence of his engagement in abstract fields of mathematics, as algebra; finally, it was a necessity to overspread worldwide his work. Dipert stressed the importance of language in Schröder's everyday life; Volker Peckhaus, Risto Villko and Legris stated the connection between abstract algebra and a pasigraphy. I inserted Schröder in the broader context of the search for an artificial universal language.
3.1. Set-Theory. All this discourse aimed to confute a pretese foundationalism in Schröder. The third Volume of the Vorlesungen is mainly devoted to non-foundational problems; the most part of the third volume of Lectures on the Algebra of Logic handles the algebraic solution problem (5th Lecture) and from the 10th Lecture onwards, set-theory (definitions of set, of finite and infinite set; definition of function, injective and bijective, equivalence, and so on). On these topics the last Schröder will ponder.
Often, one reads that Schröder's work on relation was interrupted by his death. Schröder finished the first part of the 3rd volume of the Lectures in 1895. He will die only in 1902. In these seven years he puts aside the theory of relations, considered in itself, to study settheoretic problems expressed in his new forged language of relatives. To be precise, the following are the last papers by Schröder:
( 51 This paper is a very short summary of the ninth lecture from the third volume of the Vorlesungen. 52 In this short note, Schröder states the conditions under which two set can be said equivalent.
APPENDIX A
In this short appendix, we will prove the principle of induction in the calculus of relatives. In order to be as clear as possible, I will use the principle in issue in my own formulation, reminding that it is equivalent to Schröder's one. Then, we must demonstrate that:
By hypothesis, the generator of the chain a 0 ; b belongs to c:
Then, by theorem D36,
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, by (2), and by transitivity:
From the same theorem D36 we can easily infer that a; a; b ⊆ a; b; from this, (3), and transitivity:
(4) a; a; b ⊆ c.
Iterating n times the process, using D36, our hypothesis b ⊆ c and transitivity, we obtain:
n times a; a; . . . ; a; b ⊆ c.
Let us simplify (5) using Schröder's own definition, Def.
n times a; a; . . . ; a; b ≡ a 00 ; b.
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The definition above enable us to compactify (5):
(6) a 00 ; b ⊆ c.
From (2) and (6), we can state: Finally, from (7) and (8) it follows:
(9) a 0 ; b ⊆ c.
3.2.
Commentary. This proof is highly interesting for many reasons. Let us see why.
First of all, notice that in theorem D36 we may omit the reference to the domain b which is closed under the map in issue. The result is surprising:
a; a ⊆ a.
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This is the condition which a relative a must satisfy in order to be transitive. If we take in account of this fact, it will be manifest that in the calculus of relatives we don't need the concept of chain. It is sufficient to require that the relative a be transitive. In other words, this proof gets rid of the concept of set, of similar mapping and of chain. the principle of induction, which leads us to the concept of set of natural numbers, in the calculus of relatives is sufficient that the relation under which a relative is closed be transitive, and furthermore that we can express a chain by its generators plus the iteration of the mapping in question. That a 0 ; b is equivalent to n times a; a; . . . ; a; b is shown already at page 326 of [Sch66] , just before Schröder's investigations on transitivity.
Taking in account that both the transitivity and the shortcut for n times a; a; . . . ; a; b are in the eight lecture and not in the ninth (devoted to the chain theory), our proof is saying that Schröder did not need to translate Dedekind's chain theory in his one to found mathematics. It could accomplish this task, before introducing the chain theory. Ergo, we obtained a further rationale to deny the foundational goals in Schröder. If he would found mathematics, he could do it already in the eight lecture, but he did not. As a matter of fact, Schröder aimed not to found mathematics, but to cast light on the power of his calculus, which is another question.
Finally, all the stuff we employed in order to prove the principle of induction is part of a work on the Solution Problem. Is all this not sufficient to persuade my opponents form whom I am not a serious scholar, that Schröder had a mathematical point of view in analyzing the calculus of relations? universal first-order quantifier existential first-order quantifier
